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CASE NOTES
FEDERAL JURISDICTION-YOUNGER v. HARRIS: A
CURRENT APPRAISAL OF THE POLICY AGAINST
FEDERAL COURT INTERFERENCE WITH
STATE COURT PROCEEDINGS
On September 20, 1966 John Harris, Jr., who had been advocating
the aims of the political party to which he belonged through the dis-
tribution of pamphlets on the steps of the Los Angeles County Court-
house, was indicted in the California State Court and charged with vio-
lation of the California Criminal Syndicalism Act.1 Harris was unsuc-
cessful in the California Superior Court in his suit for a dismissal of the
1. CAL. PEN. CODE §§ 11400-11401 (West Supp. 1970), also known as the
CALIFORNIA CRIMINAL SYNDICALISM AcT:
"§ 11400. Definition
"'Criminal syndicalism' as used in this article means any doctrine or precept ad-
vocating, teaching or aiding and abetting the commission of crime, sabotage (which
word is hereby defined as meaning wilful and malicious physical damage or injury
to physical property), or unlawful acts of force and violence or unlawful methods
of terrorism as a means of accomplishing a change in industrial ownership or con-
trol, or effecting any political change.
"§ 11401. Offense; punishment
"Any person who:
"1. By spoken or written words or personal conduct advocates, teaches or aids
and abets criminal syndicalism or the duty, necessity or propriety of committing
crime, sabotage, violence or any unlawful method of terrorism as a means of ac-
complishing a change in industrial ownership or control, or effecting any political
change; or
"2. Wilfully and deliberately by spoken or written words justifies or attempts to
justify criminal syndicalism or the commission or attempt to commit crime, sabo-
tage, violence or unlawful methods of terrorism with intent to approve, advocate
or further the doctrine of criminal syndicalism; or
"3. Prints, publishes, edits, issues or circulates or publicly displays any book,
paper, pamphlet, document, poster or written or printed matter in any other form,
containing or carrying written or printed advocacy, teaching, or aid and abetment
of, or advising, criminal syndicalism; or
"4. Organizes or assists in organizing, or is or knowingly becomes a member of,
any organization, society, group or assemblage of persons organized or assembled to
advocate, teach or aid and abet criminal syndicalism; or
"5. Wilfully by personal act or conduct, practices or commits any act advised,
advocated, taught or aided and abetted by the doctrine or precept of criminal syn-
dicalism, with intent to accomplish a change in industrial ownership or control, or
effecting any political change;
"Is guilty of a felony and punishable by imprisonment in the state prison not
less than one nor more than 14 years."
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indictment against him on the grounds of the unconstitutionality of the
Act. Next, he petitioned for writs of prohibition in the California Court
of Appeals and the California Supreme Court to prevent the trial of the
pending criminal action. These petitions were denied without opinion
and without hearing. Finally, Harris sued in a federal district court to
enjoin the District Attorney of Los Angeles County, Evelle Younger,
from prosecuting him, alleging that the prosecution and even the pre-
sence of the Act inhibited him in the exercise of his rights of free
speech and press, as guaranteed by the first and fourteenth amendments. 2
Intervening as plaintiffs in the suit were Jim Dan and Diane Hirsch,
who claimed that the prosecution of Harris would inhibit them as mem-
bers of the Progressive Labor Party from peacefully advocating the pro-
gram of their party, which was the substitution of socialism in place of
capitalism and the abolition of the profit system of production in this
country. A third intervening plaintiff Farrel Broslawsky, a history in-
structor at Los Angeles Valley College, stated that he was uncertain as
to whether his normal practice of teaching his students about the doc-
trines of Karl Marx and reading from the Communist Manifesto and
other revolutionary works might subject him to prosecution for violation
of the Act. All of the plaintiffs asserted that they would suffer irre-
parable injury unless a federal injunction was issued. Specifically they
contended that the pending prosecution and the prospect of future en-
forcement of the Act subjected them to a deprivation of their constitutional
rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970).3
A three-judge federal district court was convened pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§22844 and held that the California Criminal Syndicalism Act was void
for vagueness and overbreadth in violation of the first and fourteenth
amendments. Accordingly, the court restrained the district attorney from
further prosecution of the pending action against Harris for alleged vio-
lation of the Act. 5 The case came before the United States Supreme
Court on appeal by Mr. Younger, the State's District Attorney, pursuant
2. 281 F. Supp. 507 (C.D. Cal. 1968).
3. "Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, cus-
tom, or usage, of any State or Territory, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any
citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the
deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and
laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other
proper proceeding for redress."
4. This statute provides for the composition and procedure of the three-judge
district court whenever it is "in any action or proceeding required by Act of
Congress."
5. Supra note 2, at 517.
520 [Vol. XXI
CASE NOTES
to 28 U.S.C. § 1253 (1970). 6 Younger argued, inter alia, that only
Harris, who was indicted, had standing to challenge the Act, and that
issuance of the injunction was a violation of a long-standing judicial
policy of nonintervention and of 28 U.S.C. §2283 which provides:
A court of the United States may not grant an injunction to stay proceedings in a
State court except as expressly authorized by Act of Congress, or where necessary
in aid of its jurisdiction, or to protect or effectuate its judgments.
The Court agreed that only Harris had standing, but more importantly
ruled that the judgment of the district court, enjoining the district attorney
from prosecuting under the California Act, "must be reversed as a viola-
tion of the national policy forbidding federal courts to stay or enjoin
pending state court proceedings except under special circumstances."
Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971).
The significance of this decision lies as much in what the Court did
not hold as in what it did. The narrow holding announced in Younger
was that, in the absence of any showing of bad faith, harassment, or
any other unusual circumstance that would call for equitable relief, the
possible unconstitutionality of a statute "on its face" does not in itself
justify an injunction against good faith attempts to enforce it.8 However,
of equal importance is the express refusal of the Court to consider
whether 42 U.S.C. §1983, the civil rights provision, falls within the ex-
ception to 28 U.S.C. §2283, which prohibits an injunction against state
court proceedings "except as expressly authorized by Act of Congress."
The purpose of this note is to explore, as specifically enunciated in
Younger v. Harris, the significance of the federal policy of noninterven-
tion in state court proceedings except under extraordinary circumstances.
In order to more fully understand the specific holding in the case, it is
necessary to analyze the historical bases of the policy of noninterference.
Accordingly, this note shall examine the judicial and statutory arguments
supporting such a position, analyze Younger against this policy back-
ground, and provide a critical examination of the validity of this policy
in our contemporary era. This analysis and critical examination will
hopefully provide new insights into the future of the policy.
The historical bases of the federal policy of noninterference with state
6. "Except as otherwise provided by law, any party may appeal to the Su-
preme Court from an order granting or denying, after notice and hearing, an inter-
locutory or permanent injunction in any civil action, suit or proceeding required
by any Act of Congress to be heard and determined by a district court of three
judges."
7. Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 41 (1971) [hereinafter cited in text as
Younger].
8. Id. at 54.
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court proceedings draw their support from four general areas: the prin-
ciples of equity jurisprudence, the notion of comity, the doctrine of ab-
stention, and the implications of 28 U.S.C. §2283, the anti-injunction
statute. It is difficult to clearly distinguish between the impact of each
of these areas on the overall policy of noninterference, as commentators
and judges alike have obfuscated their meanings in applying their prin-
ciples to specific cases and topics. Consequently, the contribution of
each area shall be analyzed and evaluated in relation to the others.
The issue of whether or not a federal court should abstain from inter-
fering in a state court proceeding arises where an individual fears that
the state courts will not be as conscious of his constitutional rights as the
federal courts might be. Accordingly, he petitions the federal court to
declare the law, under which he fears criminal prosecution, to be uncon-
stitutional and enjoin the enforcement of that law.9  Since the prayer
seeks injunctive relief, the court is immediately confronted with the
principles of equity jurisprudence. Under these principles, in order for
equity to exercise its discretionary powers, the petitioner must have stand-
ing for equitable relief.10 His remedy at law must be inadequate 1' and
the denial of equitable relief under the circumstances must result in great
and irreparable injury.12  These principles evolved under circumstances
peculiar to the English judicial system and are generally not applicable
in this country. However, as the Court in Younger notes:
[the] fundamental purpose of restraining equity jurisdiction ... is equally im-
portant under our Constitution, in order to prevent the erosion of the role of the
jury and avoid a duplication of legal proceedings and legal sanctions where a
single suit would be adequate to protect the rights asserted. 1a
Intimately intertwined with the evolution of these equitable principles
is the notion of comity which is based upon the respect of one court for
the decisions of another. Its objective is the promotion of a harmonious
relationship between courts of different jurisdictions. The principle of
comity evolved from the English common law which held that no court
should interpose its process to take out of the hands of another coordinate
9. See Comment, Federal Intrusions In State Criminal Proceedings-New Ap-
proaches In the Abstention Doctrine, 3 U.S.F. L. Rnv. 450 (1969).
10. Douglas v. City of Jeannette, 319 U.S. 157, 162 (1943).
11. Beal v. Missouri Pacific Railroad, 312 U.S. 45, 50 (1941); Cruickshank v.
Bidwell, 176 U.S. 73 (1900); Fenner v. Boykin, 3 F.2d 674, 676 (N.D. Ga. 1925),
a!f'd, 271 U.S. 240 (1926); McCormack Bros. Co. v. City of Tacoma, 201 F. 374,
376 (W.D. Wash. 1913).
12. AFL v. Watson, 327 U.S. 582, 595 (1946); Dobbins v. City of Los Angeles,
195 U.S. 223, 241 (1904); Davis & Farnum Mfg. Co. v. Los Angeles, 189 U.S.
207, 218 (1903); Fenner v. Boykin, supra note 11.
13. Supra note 7, at 44.
CASE NOTES
court a res or cause of which the latter had taken prior jurisdiction.14
Although the principle of comity has long been recognized, it was not
until the end of the nineteenth century that the United States Supreme
Court specifically addressed itself to the limitations of that principle.
"[C]omity is not a rule of law, but one of practice, convenience and
expediency. Comity persuades; but it does not command." 15 The policy
of comity underlies much of the reasoning behind congressional legisla-
tion against federal court interference with state court proceedings. This
is true to such an extent that some courts have interpreted 28 U.S.C.
§2283 as being merely a codification of the principle of comity. As a
result many federal courts have treated the anti-injunction statute as not
mandatory but permissive.' Although the effect of 28 U.S.C. §2283
(the anti-injunction statute) has frequently been debated, there is little
doubt that the notion of comity was greatly responsible for the congress-
ional legislation culminating in §2283. It is to the history of this legis-
lation that we now turn.
The origin of the present anti-injunction statute, 28 U.S.C. §2283, can
be traced back to §5 of the Act of March 2, 1793 which provided:
"[n]or shall a writ of injunction be granted [by any court of the
United States] to stay proceedings in any court of a state. . .. "17
Numerous reasons have been postulated as to the policy behind the
Act. Some commentators have theorized that the report of Attorney
General Edmund Randolph to the House of Representatives on desirable
changes in the Judiciary Act of 1789 was responsible.' 8 Randolph
recommended that "no injunction in equity shall be granted by a Dis-
trict Court to a judgment at law of a State Court." 19  He based this
proposal upon two major considerations. First, he expressed aversion
to the practice of splitting a cause of action "by throwing the common-law
side of the question into the State Courts, and the equity side into the
federal courts."' 20  Second, the Attorney General pointed to the fatiguing
14. Warren, Federal and State Court Interference, 43 Htv. L. REV. 345, 349
(1930).
15. Mast, Foos & Co. v. Stover Mfg. Co., 177 U.S. 485, 488 (1900).
16. See Maraist, Federal Injunctive Relief Against State Court Proceedings: The
Significance of Dombrowski, 48 TEX. L. REV. 535, 542 (1970).
17. Act of March 2, 1793, ch. 22 § 5, I Stat. 334, 335 [hereinafter cited as
the 1793 Act].
18. AM. STATE PAPERS, I Misc. No. 17. Also, see Taylor and Willis, The
Power of Federal Courts to Enjoin Proceedings in State Courts, 42 YALE L.J. 1169,
1171, n. 14 (1933); Warren, supra note 14, at 347.
19. AM. STATE PAPERS, I Misc. No. 17, at 26.
20. Id. at 34.
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activities of circuit-riding. This latter consideration was later echoed in
a letter from Chief Justice Jay and his associates to the President. 2'
Other commentators suggest that the statute was a reflection of the con-
temporary dislike for unwarranted intrusion of federal courts upon state
sovereignty. This dislike intensified as a result of Chisholm v. Georgia,22
decided less than two weeks before the anti-injunction provision was
enacted into law. The case extended the scope of federal jurisdiction
by declaring that a state might be sued in the federal courts by a citizen
of another state.23 Finally, and probably more accurately, the Act of
March 2, 1793 has been thought to be the result of prevailing dislike for
chancery practice in general. Justice Frankfurter, in discussing the
trends that merged in the 1793 Statute in Toucey v. New York Life
Insurance Company,24 points to strong prejudices against equity juris-
prudence exhibited by Senator Oliver Ellsworth, later to become Chief
Justice and the principal draftsman of both the 1789 and 1793 Judiciary
Acts. No matter what the reasons were behind the enactment of the
1793 Act, the policy expressed therein is clear and without qualification-
federal courts cannot enjoin state court proceedings. The objective is
nearly identical to that of comity: "to avoid friction between the federal
government and the states resulting from the intrusion of federal au-
thority into the orderly functioning of a state's judicial process. ' 2 These
early ideas of comity and the policy behind the 1793 Act expressed in
its debates comprise the concept described by some as "Our Federalism."
This concept represents what the Court in Younger called:
A system in which there is sensitivity to the legitimate interests of both State and
National Governments, and in which the National Government, anxious though it
may be to vindicate and protect federal rights and federal interests, always en-
deavors to do so in ways that will not unduly interfere with the legitimate activities
of the States. 26
The concept of "Our Federalism" will be evaluated in greater detail
21. AM. STATE PAPERS, I Misc. No. 32, at 51. For a discussion of the sig-
nificance of the letter as an immediate stimulus to the enactment of the 1793 Act,
see FRANKFURTER & LANDIS, THE BUSINESS OF THE SUPREME COURT n. 22 & 60
(1928); and 1 WARREN, THE SUPREME COURT IN UNITED STATES HISTORY 89
(1922).
22. 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419 (1793).
23. This case resulted in the adoption of the eleventh amendment to the Con-
stitution.
24. 314 U.S. 118, 131 (1941). See also BROWN, LIFE OF OLIVER ELLSWORTH,
194 (1905); MACLOY, THE JOURNAL OF WILLIAM MACLOY, 92-94, 101-06 (1927);
Warren, New Light on the History of the Federal Judiciary Act of 1789, 37 HARV. L.
REV. 49, 96-100 (1923).
25. Toucey v. New York Life Ins. Co., 314 U.S. 118, 135 (1941).
26. Supra note 7, at 44.
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later in this note. However, for now it is important to observe the
early ideas of federalism and to examine the evolution of §2283 to the
present.
In the first case arising under the 1793 Act, Diggs & Keith v. Wolcott,27
the Supreme Court affirmed the unqualified prohibitory language of
the Act, and held that a circuit court of the United States had no power
to enjoin proceedings in a state court. Following this initial affirmation
of the 1793 Act there was a lull of sixty-five years during which no
cases under the provision were before the Supreme Court. However,
a new danger arose during this period which proved to be more of a
threat than the peril of federal intervention. This was the illegal assump-
tion of power by the state courts over federal officials and federal judicial
proceedings. 2s
During the period between 1872 and 1920 the Supreme Court fre-
quently cited the 1793 Act in declaring federal injunctions void.29 Never-
theless, it was during this same period that limitations were woven into
the force and language of the Act. In the 1874 case of French v. Hay,30
the Supreme Court held, for the first time, that exceptions to the absolute
statute might be made. There the defendant, in a Virginia state court,
had removed the suit to federal court after judgment and sought to en-
join further proceedings on the judgment by the plaintiff in a Pennsylvania
state court. The Supreme Court held that the federal court had prior
and exclusive jurisdiction of the case and the injunction could be granted
in order to protect the prior jurisdiction of the federal court.31
In 1878 Congress authorized a federal court in bankruptcy proceedings
to issue injunctions to state courts in order to protect the federal court's
jurisdiction. 32  The bankruptcy provision, enacted under the Revised
Statutes of 1874, represented the first legislative change in the Act of
1793. It was incorporated into the Judicial Code of 1911 and remained
substantially the same until the enactment of the Judicial Code of 1948
27. 8 U.S. (4 Cranch) 179 (1807).
28. See Comment, The Civil Rights Act As a Statutory Exception To the
Anti-Injunction Statute, 4 JoHN MARSHALL J. OF PRAC. AND PRoc. 55, 58 (1970);
For a comprehensive history of the cases in this period see Thompson, Abuses
of the Writ of Habeas Corpus, 18 AM. L. REV. 1 (1884).
29. Hull v. Burr, 234 U.S. 712 (1914); United States v. Parkhurst-Davis Mer-
cantile Co., 176 U.S. 317 (1900); Citizen's Bank v. Board of Liquidation, 98
U.S. 140 (1878); Haines v. Carpenter, 91 U.S. 254 (1875).
30. 89 U.S. (22 Wall.) 250 (1874).
31. Id. at 253.
32. Rev. Stat. § 720 (1878), as amended 28 U.S.C. § 379 (1926), as amended
28 U.S.C. § 379 (1940), as amended 28 U.S.C. § 2283 (1964) [hereinafter cited as
§ 2283 or the anti-injunction statute].
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when it was replaced by the general provision covering all exceptions "as
expressly authorized by Act of Congress." In addition to the Bankruptcy
Act there are ten other federal statutes which are recognized as con-
gressionally authorized exceptions to Section 2283: The Act of 1851
limiting the liability of shipowners,3 3 the federal removal provision,3 4 the
Interpleader Act of 1926, 3 the Frazier-Lemke Farm Mortgage Act,3 1'
the federal Habeas Corpus Act, 37 the Emergency Price Control Act of
1942,38 the Fair Labor Standards Act,3 9 the National Labor Relations
Act, 40 the Public Utility Holding Act,4I and Title II of the 1964 Civil
Rights Act §§201-207.42
It is beyond the scope of this note to analyze in depth the express
exceptions to §2283. 4 3 For purposes of this study it is sufficient to
understand the trends resulting from these exceptions viewed in a judi-
cial, rather than congressional setting. After analyzing numerous cases
involving the anti-injunction statute the authors of one study had this
to say:
The cases which have been examined are a startling revelation of the fate of a
statute which does not command the respect of the courts. Although sweeping
and unqualified in its terms, it does not limit the jurisdiction of the federal
courts, but only their equity powers; it does not bind them prior to the institution of
state suits, nor after judgment therein; if deemed necessary to make effective
their own jurisdiction, it is ignored altogether. . . . To say that the statute merely
enacts a doctrine of comity which already existed, and that the limitations on that
doctrine may therefore be enforced though not in terms included in the enactment,
is little more than a circumlocution announcing that the statute will be departed
from whenever, in the judgment of the court, necessity or convenience invites
departure. 44
33. 9 Stat. 635 (1851), as amended 46 U.S.C. § 185 (1970).
34. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1441-1450 (1970).
35. 28 U.S.C. § 2361 (1970).
36. 47 Stat. 1471, 1473 (1933), as amended 11 U.S.C. § 203(s) (2) (1958).
37. 28 U.S.C. § 2251 (1970).
38. 50 U.S.C. App. § 901 (Supp. II, 1964).
39. See Walling v. Block Diamond Case Mining Co., 59 F. Supp. 348, 351
(W.D. Ky. 1943); 29 U.S.C. § 217 (1970).
40. See N.L.R.B. v. Bachelder, 120 F.2d 574 cert. denied 314 U.S. 647 (7th Cir.
1941).
41. See Okin v. S.E.C., 161 F.2d 978, 980 (2nd Cir. 1947).
42. See Dilworth v. Riner, 343 F.2d 226, 230 (5th Cir. 1965).
43. For comprehensive analysis of these legislative exceptions to section 2283
see 1A MooRE, FEDERAL PRACrICE 2318-2418 (1965); Comment, How a Federal
Court May Enjoin State Infringement Upon Civil Liberties Within the Confines of
the Atlantic Coast Line Decision, 5 U.S.F. L. REV. 291, 296-97 (1971); Note, In-
compatibility-the Touchstone of Section 2283's Express Authorization Exception,
50 U. VA. L. REV. 1404, 1405 (1964).
44. Taylor and Willis, supra note 18, at 1194 (1933).
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A contrary view of the anti-injunction statute was expressed by Justice
Frankfurter in 1941 in Toucey v. New York Life Insurance Company.45
Therein the Court (by a 6-3 margin) repudiated the doctrine of relitiga-
tion which states that the federal court has the power to enjoin a proceeding
in a state court when the claim has previously been litigated in federal
court. After examining the background and legislative history of the
statute, Justice Frankfurter, speaking for the majority, said:
[t]he purpose and direction underlying the provision are manifest from its terms:
proceedings in the state courts should be free from interference by federal injunc-
tion. The provision expresses on its face the duty of "hands off" by the federal
courts in the use of the injunction to stay litigation in a state court. 4 6
In 1948 Congress enacted the present anti-injunction statute which
provides that a federal court may not enjoin state court proceedings
"except as expressly authorized by Act of Congress, or where necessary
in aid of its jurisdiction, or to protect or effectuate its judgments.1 47 Com-
menting on the new section, the revisers stated that "the revised section
restores the basic law as generally understood and interpreted prior to
the Toucy [.sic] decision."' 48  This position was to stand for only a short
time. Again it was Justice Frankfurter who reinstated the stringent
prohibition against federal interference:
We need not re-examine the series of decisions, prior to the enactment of Title 28
of the United States Code in 1948, which appeared to recognize implied excep-
tions to the historic prohibition against federal interference with state judicial
proceedings. . . . By that enactment, Congress made clear beyond cavil that the
prohibition is not to be whittled away by judicial improvisation.4 9
Chief Justice Warren, with whom Justices Black and Douglas concurred
in the dissent, criticized the position taken by Justice Frankfurter:
Contrary to the suggestion of the majority opinion, § 2283 is not broader in
scope than its predecessor, § 265. Indeed, the express purpose of § 2283 was to
contract-not expand-the prohibition of § 265. . . The only substantive change
noted by the Revisers was on the overruling of this Court's decision in [Toucey] ...
By enacting § 2283, Congress thus rejected the Toucey decision and its philoso-
phy of judicial inflexibility. . . . To read § 2283 literally-as the majority opin-
ion does-ignores not only this legislative history but also over a century of judicial
history.
5 0
45. Supra note 25.
46. Supra note 25, at 132.
47. 28 U.S.C. § 2283 (1964).
48. H.R. Rep. No. 308, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. (1948).
49. Amalgamated Clothing Workers v. Richman Brothers Co., 348 U.S. 511, 514
(1955).
50. Id. at 523 (dissenting opinions of Warren, C.J., joined by Black and
Douglas JJ.)
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The subsequent history of the anti-injunction statute can be viewed as
a struggle between these two positions: the strict interpretation ex-
pressed by Justice Frankfurter and the more liberal view expressed by
Chief Justice Warren and Justice Douglas. However, for purposes of
this study, these cases will be examined in light of all the factors influ-
encing federal court interference with state court proceedings. The anti-
injunction statute is but one of these factors. Also to be considered
are the already discussed principles of equity jurisprudence and the no-
tion of comity.
Another doctrine which the federal courts have used in refusing to
intervene in state court proceedings is abstention-a term used rather
loosely to mean that the federal courts will refuse to intervene in the
state court proceedings under any circumstances. However, the term
"abstention" also has a more specific meaning: "a more limited doctrine
[which] militates against premature and unnecessary federal decision-
making with respect to statutes whose meaning has not been clarified
by state tribunals." 51 The doctrine has been contrasted with the notion
of comity in that the latter is more general and militates against all
forms of interference with the state courts. No matter how narrowly it
is defined, abstention overlaps with the areas already discussed. Never-
theless, it is important to examine the specific contributions and develop-
ment of the doctrine before looking to its more general application.
It was not until nearly the middle of the twentieth century that the
doctrine of abstention was specifically formulated. However, antipathy
for the notions later incorporated in the doctrine was expressed early
by Chief Justice Marshall in the frequently cited case of Cohens v.
Virginia.52
The Judiciary cannot, as the legislature may, avoid a measure, because it ap-
proaches the confines of the Constitution. We cannot pass it by, because it is
doubtful. With whatever doubts, with whatever difficulties, a case may be at-
tended, we must decide it, if it be brought before us. We have no more
right to decline the exercise of jurisdiction which is given, than to usurp that
which is not given. The one or the other would be treason to the Constitution.53
It is doubtful that this dictum, though strong, ever represented a uniform
rule in the federal courts. However, even if it did, such a rule obviously
does not represent the law today. Considerations of federalism, the
maxim that unnecessary constitutional adjudications are to be avoided,
and the pattern of increased state regulations of economic and social
51. Bailey, Enjoining State Criminal Prosecutions Which Abridge First
Amendment Freedoms, 3 HARV. Civ. RIOHTS-CIV. LIB. L. REv. 67, 69 (1967).
52. Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264 (1821).
53. Id. at 404.
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life have occasioned another rule whereby federal courts will abstain from
interfering with the state courts except under extraordinary circumstances. 54
There have been a number of different approaches in applying the
doctrine of abstention. These approaches can be viewed as different
abstention doctrines55 or as distinct types of cases giving rise to absten-
tion.' 6 The first approach is where the federal court is confronted with
an issue of unsettled state law. In this type of case the court has ordered
the trial court to abstain, while retaining jurisdiction, pending state ad-
judication of the state law involved.5 7  The rationale of the court is
that: "In this situation a federal court of equity is asked to decide an
issue by making a tentative answer which may be displaced tomorrow by
a state adjudication."58 A second type of abstention is that invoked by
the federal courts to avoid unwarranted intrusion into a state's adminis-
tration of internal affairs. Here, dismissal rather than a stay is proper,
leaving the parties to seek review in the Supreme Court of any infringe-
ments in the state court action.59 Other types of abstention involve dis-
missal or a stay by the federal courts in order to ease the congestion
of their dockets"0 and the type applied is a routine diversity case, uncom-
plicated by constitutional issues or overriding state policy, in which the
federal court is faced solely with the question of unclear state law. 6'
Certainly these different types of abstention overlap a great deal.
However, they do share an underlying policy expressed most articulately
by Justice Frankfurter in the famous case of Railroad Commission of
Texas v. Pullman Company.62
These cases reflect a doctrine of abstention appropriate to our federal system
whereby the federal courts, "exercising a wise discretion," restrain their authority
because of "scrupulous regard for the rightful independence of the state govern-
ments" and for the smooth working of the federal judiciary .... This use of
equitable power is a contribution of the courts in furthering the harmonious re-
54. Note, Abstention: An Exercise In Federalism, 108 U. PA. L. REV. 226
(1959).
55. WRIGHT, LAw OF THE FEDERAL COURTS § 52, at 196 (1970).
56. Comment, Abstention Under Delaney: A Current Appraisal, 49 TEX. L.
REV. 247 (1971).
57. R.R. Commission of Texas v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496 (1941).
58. Id. at 500. For a further discussion of cases involving this type of absten-
tion see 1 BARRON & HOLTZOFF, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 64, at n. 51
(Wright ed. 19-).
59. Burford v. Sun Oil Co., 319 U.S. 315 (1943).
60. P. Beiersdorf & Co. v. McGohey, 187 F.2d 14 (2d Cir. 1951).
61. Supra note 56, at 248.
62. Supra note 57.
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lation between state and federal authority without the need of rigorous congres-
sional restriction of those powers. 63
In these few words, Justice Frankfurter capsulized a doctrine upon
which subsequent courts were to place a great deal of emphasis in a variety
of factual circumstances. The most significant of these factual circum-
stances to which the new doctrine was to be applied was the rising wave
of civil rights cases following the Second World War. It is only within
the framework of these cases that any sort of penetrating analysis of
Younger can be achieved.
There is no better setting in which to view the merger of the principles
discussed earlier than the area of civil rights litigation. The principles
of equity jurisprudence, the notion of comity, the implications of the
anti-injunction statute, and the doctrine of abstention have all been util-
ized in varying degrees by the courts in refusing to interfere with state
court proceedings. In applying these principles to particular cases the
courts have frequently deviated from the path of consistency and, in
doing so, have created a number of important exceptions. A brief
analysis of the cases creating these exceptions is essential to an under-
standing of the holding in Younger.
Prior to 1908 federal injunctions of state criminal prosecutions were
not granted because such an action was thought to be prohibited by the
eleventh amendment which forbade a suit against a state by a citizen
of that state. However, in Ex Parte Young 64 the Supreme Court granted
an injunction on the grounds that the state's prosecuting officer was
seeking to enforce an unconstitutional statute and, as such, was acting
outside the scope of his authority. Consequently, this was not an action
against the state, but rather was a suit to enjoin the state's prosecuting
oflicer. In allowing the injunction, though, the Court was careful to draw
a distinction between threatened and pending prosecutions.
[I]ndividuals, who, as officers of the State, are clothed with some duty in regard to
the enforcement of the laws of the State, and who threaten and are about to com-
mence proceedings, either of a civil or criminal nature, to enforce against parties
affected an unconstitutional act, violating the Federal Constitution, may be en-
joined by a Federal Court of equity from such action. . . . But the Federal
Court cannot, of course, interfere in a case where the proceedings were already
pending in a state court. . . . [A]n injunction against a state court would be a
violation of the whole scheme of our Government.65
Although the case was followed by strong criticism in both the courts
and Congress,6 6 the principle that federal courts can enjoin threatened
63. Supra note 57, at 501.
64. 209 U.S. 123 (1908).
65. Id. at 155-56, 162, 163.
66. Supra note 55, at §§ 48 and 49. C;
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state court proceedings in special circumstances is still recognized. A
further clarification of the principle came in the 1926 case of Fenner v.
Boykin, 6 7 cited by the Supreme Court in Younger:
Ex Parte Young, 209 U.S. 123, and following cases have established the doctrine
that when absolutely necessary for protection of constitutional rights courts of the
United States have power to enjoin state officers from instituting criminal actions.
But this may not be done except under extraordinary circumstances where the
danger of irreparable loss is both great and immediate. Ordinarily, there should
be no interference with such officers; primarily, they are charged with the duty
of prosecuting offenders against the laws of the State and must decide when and
how this is to be done. The accused should first set up and rely upon his defense
in the state courts, even though this involves a challenge of the validity of some
statute, unless it plainly appears that this course would not afford adequate pro-
tection.6 8
In the 1935 case of Spielman Motor Sales Co. v. Dodge9 the Supreme
Court again recognized that a federal court could enjoin state court
proceedings, but failed to find the special circumstances necessary for
such interference. Later, in 1941, the Supreme Court dealt more spe-
cifically with the problem of what constitutes special circumstances. Al-
though they refused to enjoin enforcement of a state criminal prosecution
in Beal v. Missouri Pacific Railroad,70 there was some language to the
effect that multiple prosecutions brought in bad faith under an unconsti-
tutional statute would constitute the special circumstances necessary to
obtain an injunction. 7' However, the Court also cautioned that:
No citizen or member of the community is immune from prosecution, in good
faith, for his alleged criminal acts. The imminence of such a prosecution even
though alleged to be unauthorized and hence unlawful is not alone ground for
relief in equity which exerts its extraordinary powers only to prevent irreparable
injury to the plaintiff who seeks its aid.7 2
Similarly in the case of Watson v. Buck 73 the Court addressed itself to
the problem of multiplicity of prosecutions and the special circumstances
necessary for injunctive relief.
A general statement that an officer stands ready to perform his duty falls far short
of such a threat as would warrant the intervention of equity. And this is es-
pecially true where there is a complete absence of any showing of a definite and
expressed intent to enforce particular clauses of a broad, comprehensive and multi-
provisioned statute. For such a general statement is not the equivalent of a threat
that prosecutions are to be begun so immediately, in such numbers, and in such
67. 271 U.S. 240 (1926).
68. Id. at 243-244, cited by the Court in Younger, supra note 7, at 45.
69. 295 U.S. 89 (1935).
70. Supra note 57.
71. Supra note 57, at 50.
72. Supra note 57, at 49.
73. 313 U.S. at 387 (1941).
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manner as to indicate the virtual certainty of that extraordinary injury which
alone justifies equitable suspension of proceedings in criminal courts. The immi-
nence and immediacy of proposed enforcement, the nature of the threats actually
made, and the exceptional and irreparable injury which complainants would sustain
if those threats were carried out are among the vital allegations which must be
shown to exist before restraint of criminal proceedings is justified. 74
Prior to the civil rights cases of the 1960's the most significant case
dealing with federal court interference with state court proceedings was
Douglas v. City of Jeannette.75 There, members of the Jehovah's Wit-
nesses sought to enjoin the city from prosecuting them for violating an
ordinance banning Sunday solicitations on grounds that such an ordi-
nance violated the constitutional guarantees of speech, press and religion.
The case is significant for several reasons. First, the Supreme Court
differentiated between the jurisdiction of a federal court to hear the
question of the constitutionality of the ordinance and the decision not to
grant an injunction because the plaintiffs did not state a claim in equity.
Second, the Court held that although the federal court had jurisdiction
the injunction could not be issued because there was no showing that the
plaintiff would suffer irreparable harm. 76 Finally, the case is important,
for it summarizes, and somewhat clarifies the earlier decisions regarding
the circumstances necessary for federal interference.
No person is immune from prosecution in good faith for his alleged criminal acts.
Its imminence, even though alleged to be in violation of constitutional guaranties,
is not a ground for equity relief since the lawfulness or constitutionality of the
statute or ordinance on which the prosecution is based may be determined as read-
ily in the criminal case as in a suit for an injunction. . . . Where the threatened
prosecution is by state officers for alleged violations of a state law, the state courts
are the final arbiters of its meaning and application, subject only to review by
this Court on federal grounds appropriately asserted. Hence the arrest by the fed-
eral courts of the processes of the criminal law within the states, and the deter-
mination of questions of criminal liability under state law by a federal court of
equity, are to be supported only on a showing of danger of irreparable injury
"both great and immediate." 77
From Douglas and the cases preceding it, a number of important proposi-
tions emerged. Primary among them was the rule that state criminal
prosecutions could be enjoined only under exceptional circumstances.
One of these circumstances is the institution of a criminal action in bad
faith under an unconstitutional state statute. However, the Supreme
Court often reiterated that the mere allegation of a prosecution brought
74. Id. at 400.
75. 319 U.S. 157 (1943).
76. Id. at 163-64.
77. Id. UNITED STATES COMMISSION ON CIVIL RIGHTS, LAW ENFORCEMENT,
A REPORT ON EQUAL PROTECTION IN THE SOUTH (1965).
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in bad faith would not of itself support federal equitable intervention.
Rather to justify federal interference, the plaintiff must show specifically
the irreparable harm that would occur if an injunction were not granted.
In effect, the Court was weighing on the one hand, the harm that would
be incurred by the individual litigant if the state prosecution were al-
lowed to continue, and on the other, the harm inflicted upon federal-
state relations by federal interference in the state action.
The history of the cases up to the middle of the twentieth century
involving federal-state relations largely resulted in the rights of the indi-
vidual litigant taking second place to the rights of the state to decide
how and when to conduct criminal prosecutions. The reasons for such
a priority can be seen in the principles discussed earlier and in the under-
lying belief that the rights of the individual litigant could be protected
equally as well in state or federal court. However, the rigidity of such
a priority was sharply, and sometimes successfully, attacked during the
active phage of the civil rights movement in the 1960's. During these
years a new priority was thought to be needed in order to rectify the
evils of a racism too long ignored in American society. The assumption
that the rights of the individual could be as well protected in state
courts as federal courts proved to be invalid. 78 Gradually, the Supreme
Court, reflecting the mood of the nation, became more responsive to the
needs in the civil rights area. Exceptional circumstances, allowing fed-
eral interference in state court proceedings, were beginning to be formu-
lated in terms of the need to emphasize the protection of civil rights.
Simultaneously, the rights guaranteed by the first amendment were
given special treatment as they were the most utilized vehicle on which
the other rights depended.
In his dissent in Harrison v. NAACP,79 Justice Douglas foresaw the
incompatibility of the Civil Rights Act 0 and the doctrine of abstention.
He suggested that the doctrine of abstention was inapplicable when a
federal court is asked to protect civil rights secured by federal legislation.
In so doing, Justice Douglas re-evaluated the doctrine of abstention in
light of the Civil Rights Act.
The rule invoked by the Court to require the Federal District Court to keep hands
off this litigation until the state court has construed these laws is a judge-made
rule .... It has indeed been extended so far as to make the presence in federal
court litigation of a state law question a convenient excuse for requiring the federal
court to hold its hand while a second litigation is undertaken in the state court ...
78. See generally, Judicial Performance in the Fifth Circuit, 73 YALE L.J. 90
(1963); SOUTHERN JUSTICE (Friedmen ed. 1965).
79. 360 U.S. 167 (1959).
80. Supra note 3 and accompanying text.
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With all due deference, this case seems to me to be the most inappropriate one of
all in which to withhold the hand of the Federal District Court. . . . [F]rom the
time when Congress first implemented the Fourteenth Amendment by the compre-
hensive Civil Rights Act of 1871 the thought has prevailed that the federal courts
are the unique tribunals which are to be utilized to preserve the civil rights of the
people. . . .81
Several years later this position was partially adopted by the majority
in Monroe v. Pape,s 2 where the Court refused to abstain in a damage
suit arising under the Civil Rights Act. In McNeese v. Board of Edu-
cation, 3 it was again Justice Douglas who expounded on the conflict be-
tween the abstention doctrine and the Civil Rights Act.
The purposes [of 42 U.S.C. § 1983] were severalfold-to override certain kinds
of state laws, to provide a remedy where state law was inadequate, "to provide a
federal remedy where the state remedy, though adequate in theory, was not avail-
able in practice .... 84
At the same time that special treatment was being given to civil rights
cases the Supreme Court was also grappling with the problem of the
first amendment and the doctrine of abstention. The Court in NAACP
v. Button 5 summarized this line of cases in the following way.
The argument is advanced that in all these situations, the need for immediate and
effective protection of First Amendment rights outweighs the values embodied in
the doctrines of comity and abstention, since First Amendment liberties are par-
ticularly "delicate and vulnerable, as well as supremely precious in our society." 8 6
In the 1964 case of Baggett v. Bullitt,8 7 the Supreme Court declared
unconstitutional a Washington statute requiring the taking of loyalty
oaths by state employees. There the Court refused to apply the doctrine
of abstention and, in the process, shed new light on the force of the
doctrine.
mhe abstention doctrine is not an automatic rule applied whenever a federal
court is faced with a doubtful issue of state law; it rather involves a discretionary
exercise of a court's equity powers. Ascertainment of whether there exist the "spe-
cial circumstances," . . . prerequisite to its application must be made on a case-by-
case basis. . . . [A]bstention operates to require piecemeal adjudication in many
courts . . . thereby delaying ultimate adjudication on the merits for an undue
length of time . .. a result quite costly .. . where the vagueness of the statute
deters constitutionally protected conduct, "the free dissemination of ideas may be
the loser." 8 8
81. Supra note 79, at 179-80.
82. 365 U.S. 167 (1961).
83. 373 U.S. 668 (1963).
84. Id. at 671-72.
85. 371 U.S. 415 (1963).
86. Id. at 433.
87. 377 U.S. 360 (1964).
88. Id. at 375, 378-79.
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Prior to Younger the most significant and controversial case concerning
federal injunctions against state prosecutions was Dombrowski v. Pfister.8 9
There the plaintiffs were members of the Southern Conference Educa-
tional Fund (SCEF), an organization "active in fostering civil rights for
Negroes in Louisiana and other States of the South." 90  Their activities
mainly involved the distribution of pamphlets, books and newspapers
and the sponsoring of speakers in order to communicate understanding
between Negro and white citizens. On October 4, 1963, law enforcement
officials arrested plaintiffs and charged them with a violation of the
Subversive Activities and Communist Control Law,91 and the Communist
Propaganda Control Law. 9 2  These criminal statutes made it a felony
for anyone remaining in the state longer than five days to fail to register
as a member of a "Communist front organization." After a very
thorough and destructive "search" of the SCEF offices,9 3 the arrest war-
rants were summarily vacated and a motion to suppress the evidence
was granted. At this point Representative Pfister, Chairman of the
Louisiana Joint Legislative Committee on Un-American Activities, de-
manded prosecution of the plaintiffs. Whereupon the plaintiffs filed a
complaint in federal district court seeking declaratory and injunctive re-
lief, alleging that the statutes were invalid on their face and that the
threats to enforce them were made only to discourage plaintiffs from
continuing their civil rights activities. A three-judge district court was
convened and dismissed the complaint for failure to state a claim upon
which relief could be granted, stating that this was an appropriate case
for abstention since a possible narrowing construction by the state
courts would avoid unnecessary decision of constitutional questions. 94 On
appeal, the United States Supreme Court reversed, finding sufficient
irreparable injury to justify equitable intervention in the impairment of
freedom of expression that would result if it were necessary to await dis-
position of the criminal action in the state courts."5 The Court noted
that "the chilling effect upon the exercise of First Amendment rights
may derive from the fact of the prosecution, unaffected by the prospect
of its success or failure."9 6 In overcoming the obstacle of the doctrine
89. 380 U.S. 479 (1965).
90. Id. at 482.
91. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 14:358-374 (Supp. 1964).
92. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 14:390-390.7 (1967).
93. See Dombrowski v. Pfister, 227 F. Supp. 556, 573 (E.D. La. 1964) (dis-
senting opinion).
94. Id. at 562-63.
95. Supra note 89, at 485-86.
96. Supra note 89, at 487.
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of abstention the Court simply stated:
ITIhe abstention doctrine is inappropriate for cases such as the present one where
• . . statutes are justifiably attacked on their face as abridging free expression, or as
applied for the purpose of discouraging protected activities. 97
Although the Court experienced some difficulty, albeit minimal, in over-
coming the restraints on federal intervention present in the doctrine of
abstention and the principles of equity, there was no difficulty in disposing
of §2283 and the accompanying notion of comity. The Court simply
stated that the anti-injunction statute, §2283, only applies to injunctions
against pending prosecutions and does not bar an injunction against the
initiation of state proceedings in the future.98
The scope of the holding in Dombrowski, sometimes referred to as the
"Dombrowski doctrine," has been the subject of a great deal of con-
troversy. One author has stated that the historic discussion "threatens
to place the jurisdictional relationship between federal and state courts
upon a new footing, one designed to encourage state judges to see eye-to-
eye with their federal counterparts on civil rights issues." 99 At the same
time another commentator has described Dombrowski as "merely an
extension of well-established legal principles to a peculiar fact situa-
tion . . . not the establishment of any broad new legal doctrine."' 100 No
matter which position is adopted there can be little debate as to the im-
pact of the decision on the subsequent cases in this area. The history of
these cases from 1965 to the present is, for the most part, a series of
attempts to define the meaning of Dombrowski.
In the 1967 case of Zwickler v. Koota,1' 1 the Supreme Court was
again faced with the doctrine of abstention where the constitutionality
of a state statute prohibiting anonymous election literature was being
challenged. At the time plaintiff commenced his action under the Civil
Rights Act' 0 2 and the Declaratory Judgment Act' 03 there was no action
pending or even immediately threatened in the state court. Thus, the
three-judge federal court was not confronted with the problems arising
from the anti-injunction statute. Nevertheless, the lower court did apply
97. Supra note 89, at 489-90.
98. Supra note 89, at 484-85 (dicta).
99. Brewer, Dombrowski v. Pfister: Federal Injunctions Against State Prosecu-
tions In Civil Rights Cases-A New Trend In Federal-State Judicial Relations, 34
FORD. L. REv. 71, 72 (1965).
100. Maraist, supra note 16, at 565.
101. 389 U.S. 241 (1967).
102. Supra note 3.
103. 28 U.S.C. § 2201 (1970).
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the doctrine of abstention on the grounds that plaintiff failed to show
any exceptional circumstances that would warrant equitable relief. 10 4 On
appeal, the United States Supreme Court reversed, stating that the dis-
trict court had the duty of adjudicating the request for a declaratory
judgment regardless of its conclusion as to the propriety of an injunction;
for as Dombrowski made clear, the questions of declaratory and of in-
junctive relief are not the same. 10 5
Another important decision in this area was Cameron v. Johnson'0 6
decided in 1968. In that case the appellants were being prosecuted for
violations of the Mississippi Anti-Picketing Law and sought declaratory
and injunctive relief in federal district court. Although the district court
refused to enjoin enforcement of the statute in the absense of bad faith,
a declaratory judgment was entered stating that the statute was valid on
its face. The lower court also held that the anti-injunction statute,
§2283, barred injunctive relief because criminal proceedings were al-
ready pending in the state court. On appeal, the Supreme Court af-
firmed the decision of the district court, but refused to pass upon the
effect of §2283 on the ground that it was unnecesary to the decision
of the case. 10 7
The view expressed by the lower court in Cameron has not been
unanimously accepted. The debate over the general force of the anti-
injunction provision has been discussed earlier. Specifically however, a
head-on clash specifically between 28 U.S.C. §2283 and 42 U.S.C. § 1983,
the civil rights provision, has posed special problems. The conflict is ob-
vious. The anti-injunction statute spells out a flat prohibition against
federal injunctions of pending state actions with a general limitation
being "except as expressly authorized by Act of Congress." 42 U.S.C.
§1983 provides that "Every person who, under color of any statute . . .
of any State . . . subjects . . . a person . . . to the deprivation of any
rights . . . secured by the Constitution . . . shall be liable to the party
injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for
redress." Certainly the latter would seem to qualify as an Act of Con-
104. 261 F. Supp. 985 (E.D.N.Y. 1966).
105. Supra note 101, at 252-55. After the district court had entered a de-
claratory judgment in accordance with this decision, a second appeal was taken.
This time, in Golden v. Zwickler, 394 U.S. 103 (1969), the Supreme Court held
that there was no longer an actual controversy and that the district court should
have refused to give a declaratory judgment. Finally, in a case decided the same
day as Younger, the Court held that where an injunction would be impermissible
under the equitable principles in Younger, declaratory relief should ordinarily be
denied as well. Samuels v. Mackell, 401 U.S. 66 (1971).
106. 390 U.S. 611 (1968).
107. Id. at 613 n.3.
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gress within the exception noted above. In Dombrowski the Court said
that under the circumstances of the case it was "unnecessary to resolve"
the conflict.10 8 Similarly, the Court in Younger v. Harris avoided both
the civil rights exception and the applicability of §2283 (the anti-injunc-
tion statute) to declaratory judgments, stating:
[T]he Court does not reach any questions concerning the independent force of
the federal anti-injunction statute, 28 U.S.C. § 2283. Thus we do not decide
whether the word "injunction" in § 2283 should be interpreted to include a de-
claratory judgment, or whether an injunction to stay proceedings in a state court
is "expressly authorized" by § 1 of the Civil Rights Act of 1871, now 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983.109
Although the United States Supreme Court has shied away from the
conflict presented, the lower federal courts have not been nearly as hesi-
tant. As early as 1950, the third circuit held that §1983 is within the
"expressly authorized" exception. 10 However, in a later line of cases
the fourth, fifth and seventh circuits have interpreted §2283 more
strictly and have not recognized §1983 as an exception."' This dis-
harmony, though indeed very important, is not central to the analysis
attempted here; for the Supreme Court in Younger chose to avoid this
controversy. Thus, any further discussion would amount only to specu-
lation of what will be the reconciliation at a future date. 1 2 Nevertheless,
it is relevent to keep in mind the controversy during this analysis, be-
cause the future resolution of the §2283-§1983 conflict will necessarily
emerge from all the policy considerations discussed in the note. Perhaps
it is pertinent here to briefly note the possible significance of the express
refusal by the Court in Younger to deal with the problem. In Younger
there were proceedings under way, indictments had been returned, yet
the Court curiously chose not to base its decision to refuse injunctive re-
lief on the statutory provision. The mere silence of the Court here
betrays a lack of confidence to place its holding on the strength of §2283.
Instead, the Court elected to consider all of the other policy arguments
and base its decision on the longstanding judicial policy against federal
interference with state court proceedings.
108. Supra note 89, at 484 n.2.
109. 401 U.S. 37, 55 (1971).
110. Cooper v. Hutchinson, 184 F.2d 119 (3d Cir. 1950).
Ill. See Baines v. City of Danville, 337 F.2d 579 (4th Cir. en banc 1964);
Goss v. Illinois, 312 F.2d 257 (7th Cir. 1963) (dicta); Brooks v. Briley, 274 F.
Supp. 538 (M.D. Tenn. 1967), aff'd, 391 U.S. 361 (1968).
112. For a further discussion see Brewer, supra note 99, at 97-103; Boyer,
Federal Injunctive Relief: A Counterpoise Against the Use of State Criminal
Prosecutions Designed to Deter the Exercise of Preferred Constitutional Rights,
13 How. L.J. 51 (1967); Maraist, supra note 16, at 535; Comment, supra note 28,
at 55; Comment, supra note 43, at 291.
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The debate over the proper scope of the Dombrowski holding has
continued to the present. Yet the Court in Younger v. Harris did an-
swer some of the questions that have arisen concerning the propriety of
the issuance of injunctions against state court proceedings where funda-
mental civil rights and first amendment freedoms are involved. At the
same time the Court also revealed valuable insights into the proper role
of federal courts within our system of federalism.
In holding the doctrine of abstention inapplicable under the circum-
stances of Harris v. Younger,113 the three-judge federal district court re-
lied heavily on Dombrowski. Specifically the court noted the language
in the case stating that "the abstention doctrine is inappropriate . . .
where . . . statutes are justifiably attacked on their face as abridging
free expression or as applied for the purposes of discouraging protected
activities. '"114 Thus, the lower court construed Dombrowski as allowing
injunctive relief, even in the absence of bad faith or harassment, where
a state statute was found to be unconstitionally vague or overbroad. In
reversing, the Supreme Court disregarded this language in Dombrowski
although they did recognize "that there are some statements in the
Dombrowski opinion that would seem to support this argument." 1 5
Despite the fact that the Younger Court acknowledged "the chilling
effect" of a criminal prosecution under a statute regulating expression,
they held this "chilling effect" by itself did not justify federal interven-
tion." 6  In its narrow reading of Dombrowski, the Court limited its
holding to the facts of the case which involved bad faith and harassment.
In the absence of these unusual circumstances, the Supreme Court held
that "the injury Harris faces is solely 'that incidental to every criminal
proceeding brought lawfully and in good faith,' [citing Douglas v. City
of Jeanette] and therefore, under the settled doctrine we have already
described, he is not entitled to equitable relief 'even if such statutes
are unconstitutional' [citing Buck v. Watson]. 11 7 After citing numerous
cases and policy considerations, discussed earlier, the Supreme Court
turned to a consideration of several historical arguments. The first argu-
ment advanced from this latter area was the concept of "Our Federalism."
This notion has been defined earlier," 8 but briefly, Justice Black, speak-
ing for the majority, described it as "a continuance of the belief that
113. Supra note 2.
114. Supra note 89, at 489-90.
115. Supra note 109, at 50.
116. Supra note 109, at 50-51.
117. Supra note 109, at 50-51.
118. Supra note 26 and accompanying text.
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the National Government will fare best if the States and their institutions
are left free to perform their separate functions in their separate ways."' "1 9
The Court went on to speak of the "highly important place" occupied by
this concept and its dominant place in the thinking of the Framers of
our Constitution. 2 0 Another historical argument advanced by the Court
was based on "the separation of branches" principle. The Court viewed
federal court intrusion into state court proceedings, as apparently con-
templated by Dombrowski, as being "fundamentally at odds with the
function of the federal courts in our Constitution.' 2 1  Basically, the
Court held that such a procedure for testing the constitutionality of a
statute "on its face" would amount to a usurpation of the legislative pre-
rogative, for "it can seldom be appropriate for these courts to exercise
any such power of prior approval or veto over the legislative process."'1 22
In the application of these historical arguments to the holding of the
case and in the majority's final word on Dombrowski, Justice Black
stated:
For these reasons, fundamental not only to our federal system but also to the
basic functions of the Judicial Branch of the National Government under our
Constitution, we hold that the Dombrowski decision should not be regarded as
having upset the settled doctrines that have always confined very narrowly the
availability of injunctive relief against state criminal prosecutions. 1 23
Following this holding the Court made some interesting comments in-
dicating that it might be possible to show irreparable injury sufficient to
justify federal intervention even in the absence of bad faith and harass-
ment. The Court cited one such circumstance, mentioned in the case of
Buck v. Watson,12 4 where it was said that "a statute might be flagrantly
and patently violative of express Constitutional prohibitions in every
clause, sentence and paragraph, and in whatever manner and against
whomever an effort might be made to apply it.' ' 1 25 In concluding the
majority opinion, Justice Black refrained from elaborating on other cir-
cumstances that might justify equitable intervention and reiterated the
Court's avoidance of the §2283 controversy.
Other unusual situations calling for federal intervention might also arise, but there
is no point in our attempting now to specify what they might be. It is sufficient
for purposes of the present case to hold, as we do, that the possible unconstitu-
119. Supra note 109, at 44.
120. Supra note 109, at 44-45.
121. Supra note 109, at 52.
122. Supra note 109, at 53.
123. Supra note 109, at 53.
124. Supra note 73.
125. Supra note 73, at 402.
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tionality of a statute "on its face" does not in itself justify an injunction against
good-faith attempts to enforce it, and that appellee Harris has failed to make
any showing of any other unusual circumstance that would call for equitable relief.
Because our holding rests on the absence of the factors necessary under equitable
principles to justify federal intervention, we have no occasion to consider whether
28 U.S.C. § 2283, which prohibits an injunction against state court proceedings
"except as expressly authorized by Act of Congress" would in and of itself be
controlling under the circumstances of this case. 126
The concluding remarks of Justice Black are a stark reminder that
Younger v. Harris has only resolved a fraction of the problems arising
from the general issues of whether or not a federal court may interfere
with a state court proceeding, and if so, under what circumstances it
may do so. The Court in Younger stood for the proposition that a
federal court cannot properly enjoin enforcement of a state statute solely
on the basis of a showing that the statute "on its face" abridges first
amendment rights. At the same time the Court stated that extraordinary
circumstances justifying federal intervention could be shown even in the
absence of bad faith or harassment. However, the Court refused to
designate what these unusual situations might be. Finally, the Court
significantly chose not to base its decision on §2283, but on equitable
principles and the longstanding judicial policy of nonintervention sup-
ported by historical arguments. These views expressed by the majority
disclose a shaky belief that state courts are equally as able to vindicate
constitutional rights as the federal courts. It is arguable whether or
not this belief is justified in view of the abuses in civil rights and first
amendment cases in the last few decades. However, it should be readily
apparent that, at the least, this belief in equal treatment, formulated in
the early case of Douglas v. City of Jeanette,127 was severely shaken by
the abuses wrought by certain state courts in this area. Attesting to the
instability of this assumption in our era is the number of litigants still
seeking better treatment in federal courts as well as the hesitancy by the
Supreme Court to approach the §2283-§1983 controversy in order to
leave this avenue open should it become necessary to correct abuses in
the future.
The majority opinion is a narrow one in the sense that it strictly con-
strues the holding in Dombrowski. However, in another sense, it is a
very broad opinion, because it discusses all the policy considerations and
historical arguments pertinent to this area of federal-state relations. The
historical approach conveys a somewhat static view of federalism. The
majority opinion stresses the important nature of the concept known as
126. Supra note 109, at 54.
127. Supra note 75.
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"Our Federalism" and its high priority in the minds of the Framers
and the important place it occupies presently in our nation's history.
This view of federalism is vigorously objected to by Justice Douglas in
his dissent. His dynamic concept of the history of federalism in this
nation relates a much more meaningful analysis of American history.
Particularly his analysis of the change in emphasis on civil rights and
the later preferred treatment afforded the first amendment.
In his dissent, Justice Douglas also took an historical approach to the
problem surrounding the policy of nonintervention. While he agreed
with the majority's view of federalism at the time of the enactment of
the first anti-injunction statute in 1793, Justice Douglas emphasized the
change that took place after the Civil War.
Whatever the balance of the pressures of localism and nationalism prior to the Civil
War, they were fundamentally altered by the war. The Civil War Amendments
. . . especially § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, cemented the change in American
federalism brought on by the war. Congress immediately commenced to use its
new powers to pass legislation. Just as the first Judiciary Act, 1 Stat. 73, and the
"anti-injunction" statute represented the early views of American federalism, the
Reconstruction statutes, including the enlargement of federal jurisdiction, represent
a later view of American federalism.
One of the jurisdiction-enlarging statutes passed during Reconstruction was
the Act of April 20, 1871 . . . 17 Stat. 13 . . now codified as 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983. ... 128
A similar view was expressed by a three-judge district court in Landry
v. Daley.1 2 9  Plaintiffs brought an action for injunctive and declaratory
relief seeking to prevent the enforcement of various Illinois statutes; some
of the statutes were the basis for the arrest of certain plaintiffs, and all,
they claimed, were being used to intimidate them in the exercise of their
first amendment rights. In denying the defendants' motions to dismiss,
Judge Will spoke of the Civil War Amendments as "a constitutional revo-
lution in the nature of American federalism."
1 3 0
This revolution, in turn, represents a historical judgment. It emphasizes the
overwhelming concern of the Reconstruction Congresses for the protection of the
newly won rights of freedmen. By interposing the federal government between
the states and their inhabitants, these Congresses sought to avoid the risk of
nullification of these rights by the states. With the subsequent passage of the Act
of 1871, Congress sought to implement this plan by expanding the federal judicial
power. Section 1983 is, therefore, not only an expression of the importance of
protecting federal rights from infringement by the states but also, where neces-
sary, the desire to place the national government between the state and its citizens. 1 3 1
128. Supra note 109, at 61-62.
129. 288 F. Supp. 200 (N.D. 11. 1968).
130. Id. at 223.
131. Id. In a companion case, handed down the same day as Younger,
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In developing this thought Justice Douglas demonstrates the preferred
treatment that should be afforded to civil rights and first amendment
cases. Rebutting the implied presumption of the majority that these
rights no longer require this special type of federal protection, Justice
Douglas discusses the contemporary era and particularly the problems
that faced Dombrowski.
The fact that we are in a period of history when enormous extrajudicial sanctions
are imposed on those who assert their First Amendment tights in unpopular
causes emphasizes the wisdom of Dombrowski v. Pftster .... There we recog-
nized that in times of repression, when interests with powerful spokesmen gen-
erate symbolic pogroms against nonconformists, the federal judiciary, charged by
Congress with special vigilance for protection of civil rights, has special responsi-
bilities to prevent an erosion of the individual's constitutional rights.' 3 2
While a sizeable number of jurists would agree with Justice Douglas
in his analysis of the need for special protection of these rights at the
time of the Civil War, some feel that contemporary circumstances have
substantially altered this need. Such a position fails to recognize, as one
scholar so concisely emphasized, that "the danger is unhappily not
past."' 33 It is true that the abuses in the civil rights area were more
patent at the time of the Civil War, but the fact that these same abuses
exist in a latent state in our contemporary society makes them no more
tolerable. Recognizing this situation, the American Law Institute form-
ulated a revision of §2283 that would allow for greater federal jurisdiction
particularly in civil rights cases. In taking into account other, already
recognized, exceptions to the statute, their proposal reads:
A court of the United States shall not grant an injunction to stay proceedings in a
State court, including the enforcement of a judgment of a State court, unless such
an injunction is otherwise warranted, and: (1) an Act of Congress authorizes
such relief or provides that other proceedings shall cease; or (2) the injunction is
requested by the United States, or an officer or agency thereof; or (3) the injunc-
tion is necessary to protect the jurisdiction of the court over property in its custody
or subject to its control; or (4) the injunction is in aid of a claim for inter-
pleader; or (5) the injunction is necessary to protect or effectuate an existing
judgment of the court; or (6) the injunction is sought to preserve temporarily the
the Supreme Court reversed the holding delivered by Judge Will in the lower court.
The Supreme Court held that "since no appellee suffered, or was threatened with
great and immediate irreparable injury and the future application of the statute to
any appellee was merely speculative, the district court was not warranted in inter-
fering with state law enforcement by the issuance of an injunction or declaratory
judgment." Landry v. Daley, 401 U.S. 77, 80-81 (1971), accord, Perez v. Ledesma,
401 U.S. 82 (1971); Dyson v. Stein, 401 U.S. 200 (1971); Byrne v. Karalexis, 401
U.S. 216 (1971).
132. Supra note 109, at 58.
133. Wechsler, Federal Jurisdiction and the Revision of the Judicial Code,
13 LAw AND CONTEMP. PROB. 216, 230 (1948).
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status quo pending determination of whether this section permits grant of a perma-
nent injunction; or (7) the injunction is to restrain a criminal prosecution that
should not be permitted to continue either because the statute or other law that is
the basis of the prosecution plainly cannot constitutionally be applied to the party
seeking the injunction or because the prosecution is so plainly discriminatory as to
amount to a denial of the equal protection of the laws.'3 4
Such a proposal clearly goes beyond the existing law, yet it does represent
a significant response to the needs already discussed. Another suggested
approach to the problem of balancing the individual's constitutional
rights against the federal policy of nonintervention is simply the judicial
resolution of the §2283-§1983 controversy, proposed by Justice Douglas
in his dissent.
I hold to the view that § 1983 is included in the "expressly authorized" excep-
tion to § 2283. . . There is no more good reason for allowing a general statute
dealing with federalism passed at the end of the 18th century to control another
statute also dealing with federalism, passed almost 80 years later, than to conclude
that the early concepts of federalism were not changed by the Civil War.' 3 5
Good reason or not the majority in Younger v. Harris, by expressly
refusing to deal with the above controversy, in effect did hold that
§1983, the Civil Rights Act of 1871, was controlled by §2283, the anti-
injunction provision of 1793. In so doing the Supreme Court has em-
barked upon a trend of restraint which has been criticized by a
number of commentators, 3 0 some of whom have believed that even a
liberal reading of Dombrowski would be "insufficient, in practice, to in-
sure fully effective protection of first amendment rights. 13 7  In the final
analysis, though, it is only history that can fairly determine the validity
of such criticism of Younger.
Finally, it is valuable to briefly reiterate the significance of Younger.
The Supreme Court in Younger v. Harris, in a narrow holding, decided
that in the absence of bad faith, harassment or other unusual circum-
stances justifying equitable relief, federal courts may not interfere with
state court proceedings. Of broader significance, was the express re-
fusal of the Court to rely on 28 U.S.C. §2283, the anti-injunction pro-
vision, as a basis for its decision not to interfere. Instead, the Court
chose to base its decision on the "longstanding judicial policy" of nonin-
tervention supported by the four historical restraints on federal juris-
134. ALI, STUDY OF THE DIVISION OF JURISDICTION BETWEEN STATE AND FED-
ERAL COURTS, 51-52 (1969).
135. Supra note 109, at 62.
136. See Bailey, supra note 51; Boyer, supra note 112; Lusky, Racial Dis-
crimination and the Federal Law: A Problem of Nullification, 63 COLUM. L. REv.
1163 (1963); Comment, supra note 43.
137. Supra note 51, at 69.
544 [Vol. XXI
1971] CASE NOTES 545
diction--equity jurisprudence, comity, the implications of §2283, and
abstention. These historical bases of the policy of nonintervention help
comprise the concept of "Our Federalism," that was so paramount in
the thinking of the majority. However, such a theory betrays a funda-
mental misconception of the contemporary era in which our nation finds
itself.
In the final analysis though, it is the dissenting view of Justice Douglas
which voices a deeper understanding of the perils that threaten our
society; it is his views that emerge as exceptionally meaningful from the
controversy involving the circumstances under which a federal court may
interfere in a state court proceeding.
The eternal temptation, of course, has been to arrest the speaker rather than to
correct the conditions about which he complains. I see no reason why these
appellees should be made to walk the treacherous ground of these statutes. They,
like other citizens, need the umbrella of the First Amendment as they study, analyze,
discuss, and debate the troubles of these days. When criminal prosecutions can
be leveled against them because they express unpopular views, the society of the
dialogue is in danger.138
Thus, it is not the sophisticated issues of federalism that are jeopardized,
but rather the individual's fundamental freedom of expression.
Thomas J. Reed
138. Supra note 109, at 65.
